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CASES NOTED
feels the record justifies. '" Justice Jackson expressed a third view to the
effect that no lower federal court should entertain a habeas corpus petition
from a state prisoner unless there is a jurisdictional problem whereby there
is no adequate remedy available.9
Since the denial of certiorari means only that the Supreme Court did
not deem the questions presented therein of sufficient importance
for their consideration, it seems harsh that this should be the last appeal
to the courts by a man condemned to die. Denial of certiorari should be




Plaintiffs filed suit for specific performance of a contract of sale and
moved for an injunction pendente lite, which was denied. Plaintiffs then
filed a notice of appeal and applied for a stay pending appeal. This stay
was also denied. After an order to show cause why plaintiffs should not be
enjoined from instituting an action in another jurisdiction based on the
same subject matter, had been directed to them, but before the return day
of the order, plaintiffs filed their notice of voluntary dismissal.1 Upon a
denial of defendant's motion to vacate the notice of dismissal, defendant
appealed. Held, although neither an answer nor a motion for summary
judgment had been filed, a literal application of the rule would defeat its
purpose of preventing arbitrary dismissal after an advanced stage of the
suit had been reached. Harvey Aluminum, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co.,
203 F.2d 105 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 73 Sup. Ct. 949 (1953).
Before the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure a plaintiff
had an absolute right to discontinue or dismiss his action at law at any time
prior to verdict or judgment.2 By virtue of the Conformity Act3 federal
courts were bound in matters of practice in actions at law, including questions
of voluntary dismissal, by the practice of the state courts in the territories
in which the respective federal courts had jurisdiction.4 The plaintiff's right
8. Id. at 407.
9. Id. at 423.
I. FMn. R. Civ. P. 41 (a) (i), as amended (1946). Florida rule provides for similar
dismissal under FLORIDA CoMMor LAw RXrLE 3 (a)(i). ", . . an action may be
dismissed by the plaintiff without order of court (1) by filing a notice of dismissal
at any time before service by the adverse party of an answer or of a motion for summary
judgment, whichever first occurs ......
2 . In re Skinner & Eddy Corp., 265 U.S. 86 (1924); Barrett v. Virginian R.R.,
250 U.S. 473 (1919 ); McGowan v. Columbia River Packer's Ass'n, 245 U.S. 352 (1917);
Confiscation Cases, 7 Wall. 454, 457 (U.S. 1869); Veazic v. Wadleigh, 11 Pet. 55
(U.S. 1837); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Stack, 60 F.2d 830 (4th Cir. 1932).
3. Rav. STAT. § 914 (1874), 28 U.S.C. §724 (1948).
4. Barrett v. Virginian R.R., 250 U.S. 473 (1919); Nudd v. Burrows, 91 U.S. 426
(1875).
MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
to a voluntary nonsuit was emphasized by cases holding that the right still
existed even after the trial court had announced its intention to direct a
verdict in favor of the defendant.5 In equity practice, prior to the rules,
the plaintiff had the absolute right to dismiss6 unless some "plain legal
prejudice" would "result to the defendant,"7 and this right could be exercised
at any time prior to an interlocutory or final decree.8 This right, however,
was subject to district court rules,9 and permission of the court was
necessary. 10
With the advent of the new rules, the distinction between actions at
law and suits in equity was abolished and dismissal could be effected by
merely filing a notice of dismissal at any time prior to service of an answer."
In 1946, Rule 41(a)(1)(i)' 2 was amended so as to give the same effect to
service of a motion for summary judgment as to service of an answer.13 In
interpreting the rule the courts have applied it literally, and in so doing
have held that neither a notice of appearance, 14 nor a motion to dismiss,' 5
nor a motion for stay' are answers or motions for summary judgment within
the meaning of the rule. In the case of Fleetwood v. Milwaukee Mechanics'
Ins. Co.,17 in which various motions had been filed, the court, in commenting
on plaintiffs' right to dismiss before service of an answer, even though the
motions were pending, said, "It is obvious that if the Supreme Court had
intended to limit the right of a party to enter a voluntary dismissal, the
conditions would have been enumerated in this amended rule.""'
In the present case the court, in interpreting the rule, implies that any
activity ot plaintiffs' part which advances the stage of a suit may preclude
him from exercising his right of voluntary dismissal by notice, although there
has been no service of an answer or a motion for summary judgment. The
5. Knight v. Illinois Central R.R., 180 Fed. 368 (6th Cir. 1910); Meyer v. National
Biscuit Co., 168 Fed. 906 (7th Cir. 1909); C. M. & St. P. R.R. v. Metalstaff, 101 Fed.
769 (8th Cir. 1900); Wolcott v. Studebaker, 34 Fed. 8 (N.D. I1. 1887).
6. In re Skinner & Eddy Corp., 265 U.S. 86, 93 (1924).
7. Jones v. Sec. & Exchange Comm'n, 298 U.S. 1, 19 (1936).
8. In re Skinner & Eddy Corp. 265 U.S. 86 (1924); McCowan v. Columbia River
Packer's Ass'n, 245 U.S. 352 (1917).
9. Bronx Brass Foundry, Inc. v. Irving Trust Co., 297 U.S. 230 (1936); Young
v. So. Pac. Co. 25 F.2d 630 (2d Cir. 1928).
10. Dooley v. Fritz, 38 F.2d 123 (D. Mass. 1930).
11. ". . . an action may be dismissed by the plaintiff without order of court (i) by
filing a notice of dismissal at any time before service by the adverse party of an answer
or of a motion for summary judgment, whichever first occurs, or (ii) by filing a stipulation
of dismissal signed by all parties who have appeared in the action. Unless otherwise
stated in the notice of dismissal or stipulation, the dismissal is without prejudice, except
that a notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication upon the merits when filed by a
plaintiff who has onco dismissed in any court of the United States or of any state an
action based on or including the same claim."
12. See note I supra.
13. See criticism of original Rule 41(a) (1) (i), 3 MooRE's FED. PRACT'ICE 3037-3038
(1938).
14. Compania Plomari de Vapores, 8 F.R.D. 426 (D.C.N.Y. 1948).
15. Kilpatrick v. Texas & P. R.R., 166 F.2d 788 (2nd Cir. 1948), cert. denied,
335 U.S. 814 (1948).
16. Wilson & Co. v. Fremont Cake & Meal Co., 83 F. Supp. 900 (D. Neb. 1949).
17. 7 F.R.D. 680 (D.C. Mo. 1947).
18. Ibid. at 681.
CASES NOTED
plaintiffs were given leave to dismiss"' under Rule 41 (a) (2),2' which provides
for dismissal by order of court upon motion, and specifically provides that
such -dismissal will be without prejudice in the absence of an order to the
contrary.
Requiring plaintiffs to proceed under Rule 41(a) (2) will necessitate
further time and expense on the part of both plaintiff and defendant, appar-
ently conflicting with the spirit of Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, calling for construction of the rules to secure a just, speedy and
inexpensive determination of every action. The Court's decision
in this ease creates the necessity for a further interpretation of Rule 41 (a) (1)
in each new case that arises as to what is an "advanced stage of a suit."
Charles R. Carman.
REAL PROPERTY -EMINENT DOMAIN-
APPORTIONMENT OF AWARD BETWEEN LESSOR
AND LESSEE
The plaintiff's leased property was taken by the City of Miami Beach
under eminent domain. An offer by the City of $50,000 was accepted
by landlord and tenant, but no express agreement was made as to the
apportionment. Held, payment of the award is to be made to the lessor
as substitution for the land. The lessee's interest is satisfied by a reduction
of the rent equal to the return an investment would bring of the award
in the highest grade securities. Raleigh Operating Co. v. Naglo Corp., 3
Fla. Supp. 111 (1953).*
Although the Florida Constitution guarantees full compensation for
the taking of land by condemnation proceeding,' there have been no
reported cases in Florida determining the apportionment of the award
between lessor and lessee. It cannot be doubted that the lessee has a
definite property interest in the condemned land,2 but there is no uniform
rule applied by all jurisdictions to determine the exact amount to be
granted in the absence of an apportionment agreement in the lease. Full
19. Haney Aluminum, Inc. v. American Cynanimid Co., 203 F.2d 105, 108
(2d Cir. 1953).
20. 'By Order of Court. Except as provided in paragraph (1) of this subdivision
of this rule, an action shall not be dismissed at the plaintiff's instance save upon order
of the court and upon such terms and conditions as the court deems proper. If a counter
claim has been pleaded by a defendant prior to the service upon him of the plaintiff's
motion to dismiss, the action shall not be dismissed against the defendant's objection
unless the counterclaim can remain pending for independent adjudication by the court.
Unless otherwise specified in the order, a dismissal under this paragraph is without
prejudice."
*Editor's note: This case is on appeal.
1. FLA. Co NsT. Art. XVI § 29; see Adel] v. Boynton, 95 Fla. 984, 117 So. 507(1928; WE , FLORIDA LAW OF REAL ESTATE 94-95 (1st ed. 1926).
Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367 (1875); United States v. 26,699 Acres
of Land, 174 F.2d 367 (5th Cir. 1949); Korf v. Fleming, 239 Iowa 501, 32 N.W.2d
85 (1934).
